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Ante-mortem probate is the process of legally determining the validity of a will
prior to the testator's death. This Note examines that process in detail, beginning
with a discussion of the historical development of the ante-mortem concept. An ex-
planation of the variousproposed ante-mortem models ispresented next, followed by
a critique of the three existing ante-mortem statutes. Following a description of the
various non-ante-mortem alternatives, the Note concludes that the best possiblefor-
mulation is an administrative model ante-mortem statute.
INTRODUCTION
ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE is a procedure that allows a will
to be probated before the testator's death.' Three
states-Arkansas, North Dakota, and Ohio-have enacted ante-
mortem statutes.2 The purpose of these statutes is to ensure that
the testamentary intent of the testator is not defeated by post-
mortem litigation,3 and to reduce the economic and social costs4
of post-mortem proceedings. In their present declaratory judg-
ment form, however, ante-mortem statutes have not gained wide-
spread acceptance.5
The existing ante-mortem statutes are an expensive redun-
dancy in an area of the law already served by proven, practical,
and economical methods of ensuring the fulfillment of the testa-
* The author wishes to dedicate this Note to the judges, referees, and administrative
personnel of the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
1. See generally Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, 1 U.
Cm. L. REv. 440 (1934) (general description of the ante-mortem probate process). For
purposes of this Note, the term "testator" will be used interchangeably with "testatrix" and
is not intended to be gender-specific.
2. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-2134 to -2137 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-
08.1-01 to -04 (Supp. 1981); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.081- .085 (Page Supp. 1981).
3. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 67 & 171 and accompanying text; see generally Edwards, Antemor-
tem Probate and Judicial Power to Render or Refuse Declaratory Relief, 7 OHIo N.U.L.
REv. 189 (1980). Professor Edwards suggests that the Ohio ante-mortem statute is viable as
a declaratory judgment although "there may be minor imperfections . I..." ld. at 226.
Professor Edwards also notes that "there is doubt whether the ante-mortem procedure es-
tablished in Ohio provides the requisite finality to confer jurisdiction upon the probate
court that is necessary for rendering a valid declaration." Id. at 201.
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tor's intent.6 Proper estate planning often simplifies the estate to
the point that post-mortem litigation is no longer economically
practical.' Assuming jurisdictional acceptability, refinements such
as videotaped wills,8 self-proved wills,9 and clauses inserted into
the will,"0 can be used to reduce post-mortem litigation.''
An additional problem with existing ante-mortem statutes is
the use of a declaratory judgment action in a probate proceed-
ing.12  Probate law is encumbered with antiquated procedures
with which courts are reluctant to tamper, as well as numerous
presumptions and traditions that resist statutory alteration.
13
In addition to evaluating present ante-mortem formulations,
this Note presents an alternative to existing statutory formulations
via an administrative ante-mortem procedure.' 4 This model, al-
though dropped from active consideration by the dissolution of
the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) Committee on Ante-Mortem Probate,' 5 has sev-
eral features that make it worth reconsidering.' 6 Alternatively, re-
finements could be incorporated into existing statutes to obviate
6. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the costs associated with probate in the absence of proper
estate planning, see Beating the High Cost of Probating a Will, CHANGING TIMES, May
1981, at 45.
8. See infra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 205.
12. See supra note 5.
13. Historically, the English legal system probated a will one of two ways: the solemn
form or the common form. Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 MICH. L. REv. 503,
505 (1946). In the common form, the will was admitted to probate in an ex parte hearing in
which the executor gave his oath to affirm the validity of the will. Consequently, the will
could only be challenged after the probate of the estate. Id. at 506. In the solemn form,
witnesses testified in support of the will and interested parties were given notice of the
proceeding and an opportunity to either support or oppose admission of the will. Id.
The United States adopted the English systems of solemn and common probate on a
state-by-state basis-resulting in what one commentator has termed "a totally anomalous
legal device." Id. at 515. While there is substantial precedent for contesting a will during
the probate proceedings or after the actual probate of the will, there is no precedent for
probating the will in the absence of the normal operative condition for probate-the death
of the testator. As Justice Cardozo stated: "[w]hat has once been settled by a precedent
will not be unsettled overnight, for certainty and uniformity are gains not lightly to be
sacrificed." B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 49-50 (1928). The novelty
of contemporary ante-mortem statutes, therefore, is an important hurdle to be overcome.
14. See infra notes 133-52, 217-50 and accompanying text.
15. Telephone interview with Richard V. Wellman, Reporter for the NCCUSL Uni-
form Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act Committee, October 1, 1981.
16. See infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
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the more pressing problems.' 7 Ultimately, the failure of existing
statutes should not be interpreted as a failure of ante-mortem pro-
bate as a concept.
I. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE
Ante-mortem probate procedures' 8 allow the testator to pro-
bate his or her will prior to death.' 9 A court may then ascertain
testamentary intent while the testator is alive, thereby eliminating
the need to reconstruct this intent later.20 To avoid intestacy,
technical errors in will construction may be spotted and corrected
before death.2 1 Problems with testamentary capacity, as well as
questions of undue influence, may be resolved by the court while
the will's maker is alive.22 The result of ante-mortem probate ide-
ally is elimination of many common grounds for potential will
contests.23
An additional benefit of ante-mortem probate is lawyer ac-
countability-malpractice may be detected while the testator is
still alive to bring suit.24 Court review of the will prior to death,
moreover, will identify drafting problems that even experienced
practitioners might overlook, such as questions involving the rule
against perpetuities.25 Ante-mortem probate, therefore, has the
potential to protect not only the testator but the attorney as well.
17. Seeinfra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. The North Dakota finality ofjudg-
ment requirement should be incorporated into existing Ohio and Arkansas statutes in the
absence of further ante-mortem reform.
18. See infra notes 97-152 and accompanying text.
19. See Cavers, supra note 1, at 445-47.
20. Questions of testamentary capacity are best estalished prior to death.
Since the substantive question is capacity as of the time of execution of the testa-
ment, execution would be the ideal time to determine capacity. The longer adju-
dication of any question is postponed, the more likely it is that the quality of the
evidence available to the trier will deteriorate. In the field of testamentay capac-
ity, that probability is a certainty: post-mortem adjudication of capacity insures
by definition that the best evidence of capacity-the testator himself-will be
placed beyond the reach of the court.
Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REv. 63, 67 (1978).
21. See Redfearn, Ante-Mortem Probate, 38 COM. L.J. 571, 571 (1933).
22. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 80.
23. Under an ante-mortem plan, "the reasonable possibility of having the entire will
destroyed and the testator's intentions upset by some simple mistake would be obviated."
Redfearn, supra note 21, at 572.
24. In many cases malpractice is avoided and the court acts as a check on the drafter's
ability. Any flaws discovered at the trial stage would probably be corrected by the practi-
tioner without charge if he or she was at fault.
25. See, ag., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961)
(complexity of the rule against perpetuities held to absolve lawyer of malpractice).
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II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The first statute authorizing an ante-mortem probate proceed-
ing was enacted in Michigan in 1883.26 Three years later, how-
ever, the Michigan Supreme Court declared the Act
unconstitutional in Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge.
27
A. Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge
1. The Arguments
The testator in Lloyd presented for probate, under the Michi-
gan ante-mortem statute, a will which excluded his wife and a son
from sharing in his estate.28 The probate court decided against
the will. 29 On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the probate
court's rejection of the will on the express ground that the ante-
mortem statute was unconstitutional.30  The testator appealed to
the Michigan Supreme Court, where a unanimous court rejected
his arguments and declared the Michigan Act of 1883 void.31 The
court did not, however, reach a consensus on the basis for its
decision.32
The first opinion, written by Chief Justice Cooley, offered two
reasons for declaring the ante-mortem statute void.33 First, the
ante-mortem statute enabled the testator to circumvent the incho-
ate rights of the spouse and child.34 Second, the post-mortem pro-
26. 1883 Mich. Pub. Stat. 17. See Cavers, supra note 1, at 444; see also Fink, Ante-
Mortem Probate Revisited" Can An Idea Have A Life Afier Death., 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 264,
268-74 (1976).
27. 56 Mich. 236, 23 N.W. 28 (1885).
28. Id. at 237, 23 N.W. at 28.
29. Id. at 238, 23 N.W. at 28.
30. Id. The circuit court based this ruling on the Act's failure to provide the testator's
wife adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. Id.
31. Id. at 239, 243-44, 23 N.W. at 29, 31.
32. Of the four judges, three found the statute unconstitutional: one judge objected to
the statute as being inconsistent; two judges ruled on the constitutionality issue and also on
the grounds that potential heirs were excluded and that the statute was inconsistent. See 3
W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 26.25, at 67 n.2 (rev. ed. 1961).
33. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64. Chief Justice Cooley however, offered a
caveat
But it may be said that these rights of the widow and mother are not property
rights, and therefore not protected by the constitution, but may be taken away by
the legislature at pleasure. It is to be observed, however, that the legislature does
not profess to take them away; they remain nominally protected by the law, and
the act of 1883 is expected to have effect while preserving them.
Id. at 239, 23 N.W. at 29 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Cooley left the question of incho-
ate rights to the legislature for conclusive determination. In the absence of specific statu-
tory language declaring an established inchoate right invalid, the court must reconcile any
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ceeding did not ensure finality of the judgment."
Normally-that is, upon probate after the death of the testa-
tor-incohate rights, such as dower and the right to appoint a
guardian for the minor son, were protected by statutory and com-
mon law.36 But the Michigan Act did not require notice to the
spouse before probate, thus creating a tension between the estab-
lished post-mortem inchoate rights and the ante-mortem proceed-
ing which seemed to dispense with those rights.37 Without notice,
the spouse's inchoate rights might go unprotected, and so the ante-
mortem proceeding was declared unconstitutional.38
The second reason for declaring the ante-mortem statute void
involved the dilemma of the finality of an ante-mortem judg-
ment.39 Chief Justice Cooley articulated the problem thus:
The probate court had acted and decided against the propo-
nent, and we know of no authority for requiring the circuit
court to take cognizance of appeals in cases not properly judi-
cial, and to give its time and attention to the making of orders
which are not judgments, and which the party seeking and ob-
taining them is under no obligation to leave in force for a day
or an hour.40
Section 6 of the statute provided that a will probated under the
Act could be revoked in the same manner as a will executed under
normal circumstances. 4' If the probate court allowed the will to
be probated, the judgment would be moot if the testator later re-
voked the instrument through a statutorily prescribed physical act
or by express language of revocation in a subsequent will.42 Chief
Justice Cooley reasoned that the ease with which an ante-mortem
decision could be rendered moot by the testator eliminated any
pretext of the judgment's finality.43 Without such finality, the
ante-mortem procedure was a fruitless exercise inviting litigation
conflicts between the laws. This implicitly includes the power to declare a law unconstitu-
tional if the conflict cannot be reconciled.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 65-69.
36. Although the husband can specifically disinherit his spouse and child in a will,
Chief Justice Cooley was concerned that under the Act the wife could not challenge the
will for undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity. 56 Mich. at 238, 23 N.W. at 29.
37. Chief Justice Cooley stated: "[The Act] therefore makes no sufficient provision for
its own enforcement without conflict with other statutes not meant to be repealed and is
inoperative for that reason." 56 Mich. at 239, 23 N.W. at 29.
38. Id.
39. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
40. 56 Mich. at 239, 23 N.W. at 29.
41. 1883 Mich. Pub. St. 17, § 6.
42. See supra text accompanying note 40.
43. 56 Mich. at 239, 23 N.W. at 29.
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without end."
A second opinion was written by Justice Campbell.45 Justice
Campbell, while not rejecting Chief Justice Cooley's arguments,
felt that ante-mortem probate should be rejected outright.46 He
observed that the maxim "the living can have no heirs" was well
established as a central postulate of probate law.47 To deny this
axiom by allowing probate before the testator's death would un-
dermine the concept of an ambulatory will. During the testator's
life prospective heirs48 could die, the estate could be squandered,
or the testator could leave the court's jurisdiction.49 Thus, the final
result of ante-mortem probate would be to place a judicial seal of
approval on an uncertainty.50
A second concern voiced by Justice Campbell was the possible
harm to the family unit from the ante-mortem process.5' Prema-
ture public disclosure of the will's contents could only result in
"unfortunate spectacle" and discord within the family. 2 Disap-
pointed prospective heirs would quarrel with the testator.53 Fi-
nally, Justice Campbell asserted that concerns over the security of
a Will were obviated by a wide variety of available devices, includ-
ing "having wills executed or declared in solemn form, or ac-
knowledged before reputable officers and a sufficient number of
disinterested witnesses." 54 Justice Campbell argued that the ease
with which these accepted devices were employed outweighed the
benefits that ante-mortem probate could provide, with signifi-
cantly less stress on the courts and the family unit. 5
44. Id.
45. Id. at 244, 23 N.W. at 31.
46. Justice Campbell observed: "I am disposed to think.. . that this is not in any
sense a judicial proceeding which [the circuit court judge] was bound to consider or enter-
tain." Id. at 240, 23 N.W. at 29.
47. Id., 23 N.W. at 30.
48. For purposes of this Note, the term "prospective heirs" is used broadly to include
all potential heirs as well as beneficiaries named in a testamentary instrument.
49. 56 Mich. at 241, 23 N.W. at 30.
50. As Justice Campbell observed, "It]he law gives no preference to contingent expec-
tation." Id.
51. In dicta Justice Campbell remarked: "It is a singular, and in my judgment, a very
unfortunate spectacle to see a man compelled to enter upon a contest with the hungry
expectants of his own estate ...." Id.
52. Id. See also infra notes 120-23, 127, 140 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 51.
54. 56 Mich. at 241, 23 N.W. at 30.
55. Id. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 67-68; see also infra notes 185-216 and ac-
companying text (general discussion of non-ante-mortem alternatives).
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2. Lloyd's Contemporary Validity
Proponents of ante-mortem probate have sought to distinguish
the arguments in Lloyd on the grounds that the modem concept of
declaratory judgments was unknown when Lloyd was decided.5 6
The general acceptance of declaratory judgments following the
United States Supreme Court decision inAetna Lfe Insurance Co.
v. Haworth5" prompted advocates of ante-mortem probate to sug-
56. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 26, at 272-74. A declaratory judgment was first de-
clared unconstitutional in Michigan in Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry., 211 Mich. 592, 179
N.W. 350 (1920). Ultimately, Michigan courts accepted declaratory judgments as viable
proceedings in Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N.W. 618
(1930).
57. 300 U.S. 227 (1937). In Aetna, the Supreme Court established explicit guidelines
for determining a "controversy," which is the crucial element of a valid declaratory judg-
ment: "The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of par-
ties having adverse interests." Id. at 240-41. The Court also required that a controversy
"must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of
a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts." Id. at 241.
The test for whether a controversy could be resolved by declaratory judgment was fur-
ther modified by the Court in Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967). In
Gardner, the Court established a bifurcated inquiry to decide whether the controversy, in
this case an administrative regulation, would be ripe for judicial determination: (I)
whether the issues tendered are appropriate for judicial resolution and (2) whether hard-
ship to the parties would result if judicial relief were denied at that stage. Id. at 162.
Extension of the Supreme Court's declaratory judgment standards to the potential
problems of ante-mortem probate has been exhaustively covered by Professor Paul Ed-
wards. Edwards, Antemortem Probate and Judicial Power to Render or Refuse Declaratory
Relief, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 189 (1980). While Professor Edwards argues persuasively that
the Ohio ante-mortem statute in particular is valid as a declaratory judgment, his analysis
may also be applied to the Arkansas and North Dakota statutes. Professor Edwards sug-
gests that "artful pleading is necessary to assure that a petition for an ante-mortem validity
declaration is not dismissed." Id. at 205. On the question of justiciability, Edwards adds
that "no advance, blanket assessment may be made that an ante-mortem petition for a
validity declaration does or does not present ajusticiable controversy." Id. at 208. Profes-
sor Edwards examines other ante-mortem statute concerns and ultimately concludes:
[Allthough there may be minor imperfections in the Ohio ante mortem act, the
very attractiveness of allowing achievement of such certainty, which derives from
the often clouded goal of our probate system to allow each of us to control the
devolution of our property at death, should sway doubting courts towards
validity.
Id. at 226. Ultimately the validity of ante-mortem probate as a declaratory judgment ap-
pears to rest more on policy than precedent.
Recently the Ohio Supreme Court in Pack v. Cleveland, I Ohio St. 3d 129,438 N.E. 2d
434 (1982), held in a constitutional challenge to a Cleveland pornography ordinance that:
Where a complainant asserts the validity of a law in a declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding and shows that he is affected by, or materially interested in, a statute or
ordinance, and that he has a justiciable cause concerning such law, the litigant's
standing may be established. A justiciable cause may be shown in these instances
by the relationship of the parties concerned with the application of the law, and
there need not be an actual controversy or violation of the ordinance to give one
standing.
1982]
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gest that ante-mortem statutes could be drafted which would elim-
inate some of the basic flaws of the Michigan Act of 1883.58
The three existing ante-mortem statutes59 are based upon a
contest model of ante-mortem statute suggested by Professor
Howard Fink.60 The contest model was developed in response to
the criticisms leveled by the Lloyd court.6' These criticisms fall
into four broad categories.
a.' The Inchoate Rights Criticism. The inchoate fights criti-
cism highlights the conflict between the statutory or common law
inchoate rights of prospective heirs and the circumvention of those
rights by the ante-mortem statute.62 Contemporary ante-mortem
formulations seek to delimit interested parties, and provide them
with notice, largely by legislative fiat.63  For example, modem
statutes give the spouse an inchoate interest in the ante-mortem
proceedings and provide notice to prospective heirs.'
b. The Finality of Judgment Criticism. Chief Justice Cooley's
second objection was with the difficulty of ensuring that the
court's judgment would stand when the testator could revoke the
probated will any time after the ante-mortem proceeding.65 Pro-
ponents of ante-mortem statutes argue that declaratory judgments
by necessity are contingent on the actions of the parties involved
Id. at 131. The majority opinon in Pack gives substantial impetus to Ohio's Declaratory
Judgment Act even where the question of sufficiency of justiciability is tenuous. Whether
the liberalized justiciability test promulgated by the Pack court will suffice to uphold the
ante-mortem aspects of the Declaratory Judgment Act, id at 132 n.2, has not been directly
addressed by the court.
58. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 154-85 and accompanying text.
60. See Fink, supra note 26. See also infra notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
61. See Fink, supra note 26, at 274.
62. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
63. The problem of notice in probate proceedings has been examined extensively both
in regard to conventional probate proceedings, e.g., J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ESTATES AND TRUSTS 291-92 (5th ed. 1977); Levy, Probate in
Common Forms in the United States: The Problem of Notice in Probate Proceedings, 1952
Wis. L. REv. 420, and ante-mortem probate, e.g., Alexander & Pearson, 41ternative Models
of Ante-Mortem Probate and Procedural Due Process Limitations on Succession, 78 MICH.
L. REv. 89, 96-111 (1979); Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REv.
1066, 1096-98 (1980); Fink, supra note 26, at 279-85. The term "interested parties" in the
context of this Note refers to parties, which under common law or statute, are given specific
or inchoate rights in an estate before the testator's death without a specific inter vivos
transaction conferring those rights. These inchoate rights must still be viewed in the context
of Chief Justice Cooley's explanation of legislative prerogative. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2136 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-
02 (Supp. 1979).
65. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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in the suit.66 The absence of appellate decisions on the validity of
ante-mortem statutes as declaratory judgments affords no conclu-
sive answer to this problem.67 One existing statute, however, does
include a mechanism that may prove efficacious. 8 The North
Dakota ante-mortem statute stipulates that an ante-mortem pro-
bated will cannot be revoked unless the testator commences an-
other ante-mortem proceeding to probate a new will. 9
c. The Living Have No Heirs Criticism. Justice Campbell's
formulation of this argument in Lloyd suggests that a will is am-
bulatory until the testator's death,7" and that "premature" probate
would invalidate established precedent.7 The specific language
of the ante-mortem statutes resolves this problem. For the pur-
poses of the ante-mortem proceeding, the statute gives the pro-
spective heirs a justiciable interest.72 Since wills are statutory
creatures, however, it would seem within the bounds of legislative
discretion to confer these intangible rights.7 3 Opponents might ar-
gue that the legislature is limited in conferring rights that effec-
tively extend the jurisdiction of the courtS.74 Depending upon the
disposition of the judges, either argument may find favor with a
66. Professor Fink, however, suggests that "[tlo some extent, all declaratory judgmentsdeal with hypothetical and mutable situations." Fink, supra note 26, at 278. This appears
to conflict with the declaratory judgment requirements of a "real and substantial conflict
admitting of specific relief through a decree of conclusive character." See supra note 57.
67. The test case mentioned in Comment, The Ante Mortem Alternative to Probate
Legislation in Ohio, 9 CAP,. U.L. REv. 717, 723 n.46 (1980), brought in Franklin County
was subsequently dropped. Gugle v. Gugle, No. 326-892 (Franklin County C.P. filed Aug.
27, 1979). A test case filed in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Bost v. Cable, No. 912302
(Cuyahoga County P. CL filed July 7, 1980), was also dropped when the testator died
before the suit could be pursued.
68. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-08.1-01 to -04 (Supp. 1981).
69. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-03 (Supp. 1981). The North Dakota ante-mortem
statute states that the "will shall be binding in North Dakota unless and until the plaintiff-
testator executes a new will and institutes a new proceeding under this chapter naming the
appropriate parties to the new proceeding as well as the parties to any former proceeding
under this chapter." Id. See infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
71. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 74.
72. See, eg., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-02 (Supp. 1981).
73. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
74. This presumes, of course, that the courts can be persuaded to allow legislative
expansion of their jurisdiction. See Edwards, supra note 57, at 208; see also OHIO CONST.
art. IV, § 4(B) (establishing original jurisdiction for courts of common pleas to justiciable
matters). 'Whether the legislature can expand the court's authority beyond constitutional
justiciability constraints regarding ante-mortem probate has not been ruled upon. Ohio
courts, however, have not been overly ieceptive to this expansion of power. See Williams
v. City of Akron, 54 Ohio St. 2d 136, 374 N.E.2d 1378, 1382 (1978). Butef. Burger Brewing
Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 261 (1973) (judicial scrutiny
available with the requisite ofjusticiability for declaratory relief).
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court. The outcome, therefore, appears to be as much political as
it is legal."
d. The Security of the Testator Criticism. This fourth argu-
ment encompasses both the importance of shielding the will's con-
tents from public disclosure and the social costs involved in
allowing a testator to probate his will before death.76 The element
of security in guarding the testator's intent must be weighed
against the importance of keeping the family unit free from dis-
cord.77 Proponents of existing ante-mortem statutes which lack
safeguards against public disclosure argue that loss of confidenti-
ality is a necessary cost of insuring that the testator's intent is fol-
lowed,78 and opponents argue that the cost to the family unit is too
high.79  The ideal solution would be a procedure that offers an
alternative means of probate without public disclosure. To this
end, several ante-mortem models specifically address the disclo-
sure problem. 0
B. Declaratory Judgments Without Enabling Legislation
1. Cowan v. Cowan
Application of the four arguments set forth in Lloyd to a de-
claratory judgment action demonstrates the importance of correct
statutory formulation.8 ' In Cowan v. Cowan,82 the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals struck down the use of a declaratory judgment to
invalidate a living testator's will absent express statutory authori-
zation of ante-mortem judgments.8 3 The prospective heirs in
Cowan brought a declaratory judgment action against the testator
75. Among the courts, the crucial factor in ante-mortem probate acceptance seems to
be one of policy. See supra note 57.
76. See generally Alexander, The Conservatorshi f Model.A Modfication, 77 MicHt. L.
REv. 86, 89-90 (1978). Professor Alexander argues, in a precursor to his eventual adminis-
trative model formulation, see infra notes 133-52 and accompanying text, that a major flaw
in Professor Langbein's Conservatorship Model, see supra note 20, involves the will's dis-
closure in an ante-mortem proceeding. Disclosure presumably could lead to intrafamily
hostilities. Cf. supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous prob-
lem of the security of the testator criticism).
77. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
78. Eg., Langbein, supra note 20, at 77.
79. E.g., Alexander & Pearson, supra note 63passim.
80. Id. See also infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discussion of the various
ante-mortem models).
81. See supra note 30. The degree of notice given could be problematic without care-
ful construction of the ante-mortem statute regarding what rights are conveyed or withheld
from interested parties. See supra note 63.
82. 254 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
83. Id. at 865. -
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(who was their mother) and the named legatees in the mother's
will. 4 The Texas court dismissed the suit, citing Lloyd for the
proposition that heirs have no cognizable interest under a will un-
til the testator's death.85
The court further noted that without specific enabling legisla-
tion, Texas' declaratory judgment statute86 could not confer the
requisite jurisdiction on the prospective heirs.87 The court stated
that before invoking the Declaratory Judgments Act, "there must
be present a justiciable issue; that is, the cause of action must re-
late to matters which are within the jurisdiction of the court." 88
Echoing similar language in Lloyd,89 the Cowan court stressed the
public policy problem of allowing prospective heirs to challenge
the testator's will.90
2. The Application of Cowan to Lloyd
Cowan was decided in a jurisdiction without a specific ante-
mortem statute.91 The case does, however, indicate the scrutiny
that any ante-mortem statute based on a declaratory judgment
scheme must undergo if it is challenged. 92 Specific legislation may
authorize probate court jurisdiction over prospective heirs.
Whether the courts will accept the additional jurisdiction is en-
tirely another question.93 Although it did not reach the specific
issue of the validity of an ante-mortem statute, the Cowan court
did indicate that premature probate may not be a justiciable con-
troversy for declaratory judgment purposes.9 4
The issue that troubled the Lloyd court-how prospective
heirs can be parties to an action involving the will of a living testa-
84. Id. at 863.
85. Id. at 864.
86. TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965). Although the court speaks directly to
the validity of the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act, the opinion's language suggests rejec-
tion only of the probate court's "inherent power to determine the validity of a will prior to
the death of the maker." Id. at 864. See supra note 74.
87. 254 S.W.2d at 865.
88. Id.
89. 56 Mich. at 240, 23 N.W. at 29-30.
90. 254 S.W.2d at 864.
91. Even though the Texas Declaratory Judgments statute provided specifically for
wills, there was no provision for an ante-mortem evaluation of a will. See generally Uni-
form Declaratory Judgments Act, TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 § 2 (Vernon 1965).
92. Specific concerns include justiciability before the testator's death and whether the
mere expectancy interest of potential heirs is sufficient, absent statutory approval, to give
those heirs standing in an ante-mortem action.
93. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
94. 254 S.W.2d at 865.
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tor-remains unresolved.95 Similarly, the policy concerns articu-
lated in Lloyd regarding the efficacy of forcing intra-family
challenges over a document that may be moot by the time the
testator dies also remain unanswered.96
III. THE ANTE-MORTEM MODELS
In response to the flaws in the Michigan Ante-Mortem Act of
1883, three models have evolved.97 Which one provides the most
effective means of ensuring adherence to the testator's intent is
open to question 9s -indeed, critics argue that none comports with
the expectations of its creators.99
A. The Contest Model
The first model, proposed by Professor Fink,1°° is a variation
on the Michigan Act of 1883. Because this model is adversarial
and based on actions for declaratory judgments, 10 it has been
termed the "contest model."' 2
Under the contest model, named beneficiaries and those who
would be intestate heirs are designated as parties with standing.0 3
Protection of other potential takers is achieved under the doctrine
of virtual representation."° This doctrine, within the context of
ante-mortem litigation, posits that unborn or unascertained future
beneficiaries are protected by those presently designated to take
under the will. 0 5 If these interests were not protected, the court
could appoint a guardian ad litem. 10 6
Procedurally, the contest model requires a declaratory judg-
95. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
97. See generally infra notes 100-52 and accompanying text.
98. See generally Langbein, supra note 20, passim; Alexander & Pearson, supra note
63,passim.
99. See Fellows, supra note 63, at 1081-94.
100. See Fink, supra note 26, at 274-77.
101. This model was proposed by Professor Howard Fink as a direct response to the
earlier failure of ante-mortem probate in Michigan. See Fink, supra note 26, at 274.
102. The term "contest model" was coined by Professor Langbein. See Langbein,
supra note 20, at 63; see also Fellows, supra note 63, at 1067 n.13.
103. Fink, supra note 26, at 275.
104. Under a scheme of virtual representation, "the interests of remote and possibly
unborn takers by intestate succession would usually coincide with the interests pressed by
present takers." Id. at 275, citing Roberts, Vrtual Reresentation inActions Affecting Future
Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 580, 581 (1936).
105. Fink, supra note 26, at 275-76.
106. See id. at 276.
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ment action. 107 The testator executes the will and institutes a pro-
ceeding in the statutorily designated court, usually the probate
court in the testator's county of residence.10 8 The testator then
petitions the court for a 'judgment declaring the validity of the
will as to the signature on the will, required number of witnesses
to the signature and their signatures, and the testamentary capac-
ity and freedom from undue influence of the person executing his
will."" Notice is then sent to those parties stipulated to have an
interest in the will. Such parties include any beneficiaries men-
tioned in the will and all living intestate successors." I0 Service of
process is limited to parties who can be contacted within the state
where the ante-mortem litigation occurs.I1 I For those parties who
cannot be located, notice is provided by publication within the
plaintiffs county.112
Assuming the court finds that the will has properly been exe-
cuted and that the testator had the requisite testamentary capacity
and freedom from undue influence, the will is declared valid and
is filed with the court.'1 3 The results of the proceeding may be
nullified by the subsequent execution of a new will and the suc-
cessful completion of another ante-mortem proceeding to validate
the new will. 114
Although the contest model is the basis for the three existing
ante-mortem statutes in Arkansas, North Dakota, and Ohio," 5 it
has come under heavy criticism. 6 The notice provisions in the
contest model do not require publication beyond the state where
the will is being adjudicated. -"7 Consequently, the ultimate effect
that a judgment may have on parties in interest outside the court's
jurisdictional boundaries is constitutionally questionable." 8
Professor Fink's proposal effectively resolves the problem of
finality of judgment by requiring the testator to institute a new
107. Id. at 274.
108. Id. at 274-75.
109. Id. at 274.
110. Id. See supra text accompanying note 103.
111. Fink, supra note 26, at 274.
112. Id. at 274-75.
113. Id. at 275.
114. Id.
115. See Fellows, supra note 63, at 1066-67.
116. See, ag., Fellows, supra note 63, at 1073-74, 1080-81; Langbein, supra note 20, at
72-75.
117. See Fink, su.pra note 26, at 274-75.
118. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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ante-mortem proceeding to invalidate the old will."19 Unfortu-
nately, the contest model does not secure the contents of the will
from public disclosure. 120
The parties in interest are compelled to litigate at their own
expense without assurance that the litigated estate will exist when
the will takes effect.' Should interested parties contest the will,
moreover, there is no guarantee that the testator will not execute a
new will disinheriting the unlucky party for his or her imperti-
nence in challenging the original will. This disincentive to chal-
lenge the ante-mortem proceeding makes its "adversarial nature"
dubious. 22
In addition to these basic procedural problems, there remains
unresolved the problem of the serious strain imposed on the fam-
ily in an adversarial proceeding of this nature.'23 Given these
problems with the contest model, it is no surprise that additional
refinements have been suggested for the ante-mortem process.
B. The Conservatorship Model
Professor Langbein proposed to ameliorate several of the bur-
dens associated with the contest model. 4 Although the "conser-
vatorship model" also uses a declaratory judgment proceeding, it
eliminates the problem of compelling the prospective heirs to join
in the litigation.' Instead, the court appoints a conservator to
represent the prospective heirs' interests.'26 This refinement re-
lieves the prospective heirs of the dilemma of challenging family
in court; it also enables the court to place the financial burden of
119. Fink, supra note 26, at 275. But cf. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2137 (Supp. 1979)
(wills validated under this statute may be superceded by executing a valid subsequent in-
strument regardless of the Ante-Mortem Probate Act).
120. Arguably only an adminstrative proceeding with the opportunity to have in cam-
era evaluation of the will by the court could insure total privacy. See generally infra notes
217-50 and accompanying text.
121. The same problem was identified by the Lloyd court. See supra notes 49-50 and
accompanying text.
122. As Professor Langbein explains:
[T]he heirs apparent who successfully defend a living probate suit must still wait
for the testator's death before any of them can acquire a beneficial interest in his
property.... Depending upon the relative ages and affluence of the parties, the
difficulty of the proofs, and the other factors that bear on the risk preferences of
the heirs apparent, the financial investment necessary to defend such a lawsuit
may appear quite unwise, even though the testator be quite mad.
Langbein, supra note 20, at 74.
123. See supra note 51.
124. Langbein, supra note 20, at 63.
125. Id. at 78-79.
126. Id. at 63.
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the proceeding on the testator.12 7
The conservatorship model, however, does not solve the con-
test models problems with jurisdiction128 or with public disclosure
of the will. t2 9 Thus, although prospective heirs are not directly
involved in the litigation, tensions may still arise when they dis-
cover the contents of the will.' 3 0 Additionally, the conservator
faces the dilemma of representing multiple, and potentially con-
flicting, interests. To solve this problem the court may appoint
multiple conservators. The expense will be passed on to the testa-
tor, making an ante-mortem proceeding potentially very costly.
To compel the testator to pay the costs of litigation may preclude
the use of ante-mortem probate in those very situations where it
would be most effective.13 1
The conservatorship model, although designed to ameliorate
the weaknesses of the contest model, creates problems of its own.
Excessive costs, including the social costs on the family when the
will is disclosed, and the economic costs if multiple conservators
must be appointed, diminishes the value of the refinement.1
3 2
C. The Administrative Model
The administrative model, as the name suggests, is a signifi-
cant departure from contest model variations. 133 The administra-
tive model proposes a viable ex parte proceeding3 4 in which
127. Id. at 79-80.
128. See supra text accompanying note 118.
129. Alexander, supra note 76, at 89. See also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
130. As a result, Professor Alexander suggests: "[s]acrificing the confidentiality of the
conventional testamentary process may deter some testators who need ante-mortem pro-
bate from using it" Id. at 89.
131. For example, if there are many prospective heirs with diverse financial demands
who do not get along with one another, they might contest a will which gives them less than
a full share. Under normal circumstances, this situation would be ideal for ante-mortem
probate, but the expense of additional conservators to represent all the potentially conflict-
ing interests could be prohibitive.
132. See Fellows, supra note 63, at 1074-75.
133. See generally Alexander & Pearson, supra note 63.
134. Because the administrative proceeding is ex parte, some commentators suggest
that it denies prospective heirs due process by excluding them from an ante-mortem pro-
ceeding, and deprives the court of important "inside" information obtainable only through
interested parties. Fellows, supra note 63, at 1095-96. Others suggest that the inchoate
interests bestowed by the State are revocable where, as in the case of ante-mortem probate,
the interests of the prospective heirs are so tenuous. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note
63, at 96-111. The common law maxim that the "living have no heirs" may provide tradi-
tional support for the proposition that prospective heirs have no standing, since their inter-
est is entirely contingent on a living testator who is free to change or revoke the will.
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prospective heirs have no right to challenge the testator's will. 135
Instead of appointing conservators, the court appoints a guardian
ad litem who functions as a special master to help the court accu-
mulate the necessary information on the will maker's testamen-
tary capacity and freedom from undue influence.'
36
The administrative action is initiated by petitioning the court
to review the validity of the will.137 After reviewing the testimony
of expert witnesses, the court rules on the validity of the will.' 3
The finality of the judgment would be ensured by amending the
state will contest statutes to preclude attack on an ante-mortem
judgment except by a specifically designated group such as the
testator's "nuclear family." 139 Confidentiality of the will's contents
would be ensured by in camera evaluation of the will.' 4 Without
an adversarial proceeding there would be no need to disclose the
contents of the will to an "opposing" party.
Advantages of the administrative model include confidential-
ity of the will, conclusive effect given to the court's final determi-
nation through amendment of existing will contest statutes, and
savings in court time and other litigation costs.' The administra-
tive model therefore has the potential of being a significant im-
provement on previous models. 42
The major flaw in the administrative approach, however, is the
difficulty of utilizing an ex parte hearing in an ante-mortem pro-
ceeding.'43 Much of the administrative model'" is devoted to es-
tablishing the efficacy of a no-notice proceeding for probate. The
135. While direct challenge may be statutorily excluded, see, e.g., OHiO REv. CODE
ANN. § 2107.084 (E) (Page Supp. 1979), thereby excluding even collateral attack on the
ante-mortem proceeding to parties involved in the ante-mortem proceeding, some statutes
do not even address the question of collateral attack of the ante-mortem judgment. See
Fellows, supra note 63, at 1077-79.
136. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 63, at 113-14.
137. Id. at 112-13.
138. Id. at 116-18.
139. Id. at 119-21. In the alternative a purely ex pare proceeding "to maintain a rela-
tively simple ante-mortem determination of capacity" is preferable. Id. at 121. For pur-
poses of this Note the term "nuclear family" designates a family group consisting of a
father, mother, and children.
140. Id. at 114.
141. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
142. Contra Fellows, supra note 63. Professor Fellows' own proposals to remedy the
probate problems "by abolishing the mental capacity requirement and providing a statu-
tory election to those we most fear may suffer in the event of disinheritance," id. at 1110,
seems more extreme than necessary.
143. See supra note 134.
144. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 63, at 96-111.
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question that arises echoes Chief Justice Cooley's reasoning in
Lloyd that the rights of the spouse and children, although incho-
ate, may not be eliminated 45 without an opportunity for the inter-
ested parties to respond. Advocates of the administrative model
counter this argument by suggesting that rights, whether inchoate
or substantial, given by the state may be removed by the state. 1
46
Opponents argue that the absence of notice to parties in interest
may constitute a denial of due process, rendering the entire deter-
mination by the court unconstitutional. 147
Another problem posed by critics of the administrative model
is the practical effect of allowing a court-appointed special master
to interview friends and relatives of the testator.141 As Professor
Fellows notes, "[a]fter interviews by the guardian adlitem, family
members will likely grow curious as to the contents of the will.' 4 9
These interviews could engender the very suspicions and hostility
between family members that the model is designed to correct.150
The only definite way of testing the validity of these criticisms
is to actually use the model. That a special master's questions
might induce hostility is conjectural.' 5 ' The due process concerns,
however, are more substantial.15 2 Unfortunately, there has not
been a definitive expression by the courts on the due process
question.
IV. EXISTING ANTE-MORTEM STATUTES
The three existing ante-mortem statutes are based on a contest
model. 53 Each statute, however, represents a different philosophy
as to the ultimate effect given the ante-mortem judgment and the
145. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
146. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 63, at 96-111.
147. After extensive case analysis,-Professor Fellows concludes that "[t]he lack of notice
and hearing under the Administrative Model may therefore violate the due process clause
of the Constitution." Fellows, supra note 63, at 1109.
148. See Fellows, supra note 63, at 1076-77.
149. Id. at 1077.
150. The problem with this analysis is that prospective heirs will always be curious. In
the absence of verification of their fears, whether valid or not, the prospective heirs are left
in the same position as they were before the procedure.
151. See supra note 150.
152. At least to the extent that contemporary due process questions involve a balancing
test to assess the deficiencies of a statute, the desirability of an ante-mortem proceeding
could be weighed against the rights, if any, of the expectant heirs. See Fellows, supra note
63, at 1107 n.158. The court will have to weigh tradition against the security of the testator.
See supra note 35.
153. See supra notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
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methodology for revising that judgment. A brief discussion of
some of these basic differences follows to serve as a conceptual
basis for comparison with alternatives to the existing statutes.
A. The Arkansas Statute
The Arkansas Ante-Mortem Probate Act of 1979114 is the
shortest of the three existing state ante-mortem statutes.155 The
Arkansas statute grants probate courts the requisite jurisdiction to
entertain ante-mortem declaratory judgments. 56 The stipulated
parties to the action are all beneficiaries named in the will and all
potential intestate successors. 157 The parties are granted standing
by legislative fiat which grants them inchoate property rights. 158
The testator initiates the proceeding; if the will is declared
valid, the proceeding "shall constitute an adjudication of pro-
bate."' 59 The judgment may be revoked by a subsequent will or
codicil. 6 °
The Arkansas ante-mortem statute, therefore, is patterned af-
ter the contest model except in terms of revocability.161 The stat-
ute thus not only shares all the basic problems of the contest
model,'62 but also fails to provide a final judgment. 63 The Ar-
kansas statute has not been tested in appellate litigation. The lack
of any authoritative court pronouncements on the validity of the
contest model is unfortunate, since it impairs the development of
effective legislation.
B. The North Dakota Statute
The North Dakota Ante-Mortem Probate Act 164 also
prescribes a contest model proceeding, 65 and it includes all of the
contest model's basic procedural flaws.' 66 The North Dakota stat-
ute, however, more closely approaches the theoretical ante-
154. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-2134 to -2137 (Supp. 1979).
155. See infra notes 164-85 and accompanying text.
156. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2135 (Supp. 1979).
157. Id. § 62-2136.
158. Id. See also Langbein, supra note 20, at 74. Compare this provision with the
similar function of N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-08.1 (Supp. 1981).
159. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2137 (Supp. 1979).
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
164. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-08.1 (Supp. 1981).
165. See supra notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
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mortem model because of its unique revocation provision.167
Revocation under the statute is accomplished only when the testa-
tor executes a new will and a new ante-mortem proceeding is insti-
tuted with the proper parties. 68 The statute thus ameliorates the
finality of judgment problem, by ensuring that the court's efforts
cannot be undone solely through the execution of a new will or
codicil. 169 Like the Arkansas statute, the North Dakota law has
not been widely utilized or heavily litigated.170 Again, in the ab-
sence of appellate litigation on the statute there is no effective way
of ascertaining whether ante-mortem probate is a conceptual fail-
ure or whether practitioners are simply unaware of its existence. '7'
C. The Ohio Statute
The Ohio ante-mortem statute 72 shares certain structural sim-
ilarities with both the Arkansas and North Dakota acts.' 73 Revo-
cation can be accomplished under the Ohio statute in several
ways.174 The testator may revoke or modify a previously litigated
ante-mortem will by petitioning the court 75 or by executing a new
will or codicil. 176 The latter option, however, perpetuates the
finality of judgment problem.' 77
One feature unique to the Ohio ante-mortem statute is a clause
specifically detailing the circumstances where the court's ante-
mortem judgment may be challenged collaterally in a post-
mortem proceeding.' 78 Parties named in the original ante-mortem
suit are precluded from attacking the judgment. 179 This particular
167. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-03 (Supp. 1981).
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
170. Pursuant to a Lexis search on October 14, 1982.
171. An informal telephone survey of Cleveland probate practitioners indicated that
many were unaware that an ante-mortem statute existed. Others did not feel such a statute
was necessary, and only one felt it was usable. Of the three statutes North Dakota's is the
closest to the contest model in the sense that the statute's revocation procedures match
those originally suggested by Professor Fink, supra note 26 at 276. Litigation would be
most instructive to states considering the adoption of an ante-mortem procedure.
172. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.081 to .085 (Page Supp. 1981).
173. See supra notes 154-71 and accompanying text.
174. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.084(B)-(D) (Page Supp. 1981).
175. Id. § (C).
176. Id. § (D).
177. See .supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
178. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.084(E) (Page Supp. 1981).
179. Id. However, parties may contest the judgment "if the person is one who should
have been named a party defendant in the action in which the will, modification or codicil
was declared valid." Id. § 2107.71(B).
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refinement is similar to the administrative model approach of
eliminating will contests once the ante-mortem determination has
affirmed the will's validity. 80
The Ohio statute is the most complex of the three ante-mortem
acts. While it regulates detailed issues such as collateral attack,' 8 '
it fails to resolve the finality of judgment problem.' 82 The broad
revocation language makes any court determination subject to the
plaintiff's whim.' 83 Despite its varied potential applications, the
Ohio ante-mortem proceeding is rarely used.' 84 The probate prac-
titioner, therefore, is discouraged from using the statute because of
its untested viability, certain expense, and questionable
effectiveness.
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE ANTE-MORTEM
DILEMMA
Many alternatives to ante-mortem probate have gained wide-
spread legal viability. These alternative devices, ante-mortem
probate opponents suggest, undercut the need for an extensive
proceeding to validate the will. An examination of these proce-
dures, however, reveals that the ante-mortem probate process can
most effectively preserve the testator's intent.
A. Non-Ante-Mortem Alternatives
The testator seeking to dispose of property has three basic op-
tions. The first is to avoid the entire testamentary process by using
inter vivos trusts or other inter vivos transfers.I85 Second, the tes-
tator can use supplemental devices, such as videotaped wills or the
self-proving provisions of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), to
build a wall of presumptive validity around the will. These de-
vices can lessen the chances of success of post-mortem attacks on
the will. A third option is to use language in the will that discour-
ages post-mortem contests. Such language includes "in terrorem"
clauses and designated heir clauses. Such devices can only be
180. The similarity ends, however, with the inclusion of the exclusion to mandatory
statutory collateral estoppel. See id. § 2107.71(B); see supra note 135 and accompanying
text.
181. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 170.
185. For general background on alternatives to probate, see generally Sheard, Avoiding
Probate ofDecedents Estates, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 70 (1967) (revocable conveyances); see
also J. CORCORAN, JR., ALTERNATIVES TO PROBATE §§ 16-1 to 29-1 (1971) (trusts).
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used, of course, where the local statutes are receptive to them.
186
None of these options can assure that post-mortem litigation
will be avoided because each device is subject to attack by dissat-
isfied heirs.187 The professional estate planner uses these tech-
niques in an individual estate based on the testator's desires and
the probability of post-mortem attack.18 8 The estate planner must
determine whether, in light of these three non-ante-mortem alter-
natives, a need for ante-mortem probate really exists. To aid this
determination, each method must be examined in detail.
1. Videotafped Wills
With the widespread availability of videotape equipment pro-
bate practitioners have been quick to recognize the advantages of
videotaping wills.'8 9 In a videotaped will the testator reads the will
into a camera and records for posterity every gesture, facial ex-
pression, and verbal intonation. The impact of actually seeing the
testator reading the will is presumed to lend credibilty to the phys-
ical document while giving the testator the opportunity to speak to
the beneficiaries with candor. 19
0
The legality of videotaped evidence in general is well estab-
lished,' 9 ' and the cost minimal. 192 The videotaped will can be
used in probate as a trial tool, ensuring some measure of security
against challenges grounded on lack of testamentary capacity or
undue influence.
There are, however, certain potential problems with videotap-
ing wills. Although videotaping is useful as a supplement to the
186. See infra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
187. See Fink, supra note 26, at 265-66; see also Langbein, supra note 20, at 64-66.
188. Beating the High Cost of Probating a Will, supra note 7, at 45-46. Additional
concerns include the ramifications of local statutes. Id. at 46.
189. "Videotaped wills have existed for several years, although they have only recently
started to become widely used. They have even entered pop culture.... [Tiwo network
T.V. programs-WKRP in Cincinnati and Too Closefor Comfort-[have] worked the wills
into their plots." Lights, Cameras, Wills, TIME, Dec. 14, 1980, at 72.
190. Thanato-TV, SATURDAY REviEw, Feb. 2, 1980, at 6 (California law firm charging
$150 for a videotaped will). The credibility of videotape presentations in the courtroom
was expressed by one court:
When these factors [of conventional non-video evidence] were weighed
against the advantages of videotape, i.e., an opportunity for the jury to watch the
witness testify and the instant replay capability, the Court found that the proce-
dures ultimately employed were not only entirely proper but in fact the best solu-
tion possible.
United States v. Lafatch, 382 F. Supp. 630, 633 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
191. See, ag., First Videotape Trial- Experiment in Ohio, 21 DEFENSE L.J. 267 (1972).
192. See, eg., SATURDAY REviaw, supra note 190, at 6.
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will, technical compliance with wills statutes requires the actual
will to be written. Perhaps the videotaped will might someday be
given the same effect as a holographic will-assuming the court is
satisfied that the tape is unedited. Presently, however, a video-
taped will is no assurance of technical compliance with the wills
statutes, and may lead unknowledgeable testators to assume they
have a valid will without the written document. 93
Additionally, the videotaping process can be abused by creat-
ing an erroneous impression of the testator on the tape. Guide-
lines already exist for the use of makeup, camera angles, lighting,
and other Hollywood-type refinements in videotaped deposi-
tions.' 94 These same techniques could be used in a videotaped
will, including the use of professionally prepared scripts, to obtain
a high degree of unwarranted credibility.
In spite of the potential abuses, the videotaped will can be an
effective means of increasing the credibility of the testator's capac-
ity and freedom from undue influence. The videotaping process,
however, is not a complete solution to post-mortem litigation
problems.'95 At best the videotaped will should be used only as a
supplement to the written will.
2. The UPC Self-Proved Will
Under section 2-504 of the Uniform Probate Code a testator
may create a self-proved will. 196 A will is self-proved by execut-
ing a supplemental document attesting to the will's technical va-
lidity.' 97 This document is then signed by the testator and the
witnesses and notarized. 98
Self-proving a will dispenses with the need to call witnesses at
an informal probate proceeding to attest to the testator's signa-
ture. 199 The self-proved will, like the videotaped will, merely adds
one more quantum of evidence as to the will's validity.2" The
self-proving provision only eliminates the signature requirements
193. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (Page 1976) ("Except oral wills, every
last will and testament shall be in writing.") Id.
194. Balabanian, Medium v. Tedium" Video Depositions Come ofAge, 7 LITIGATION 25,
28-29 (1980).
195. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 68.
196. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504, 8 U.L.A. 349-50 (1972).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id., commentary at 350 (1972).
200. Langbein, supra note 20, at 68.
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foundation for post-mortem litigation."' Once admitted into pro-
bate, the self-proved will establishes a prima facie case of due exe-
cution that may still be challenged on other grounds. 20 2 A self-
proved will, therefore, also is no guarantee against post-mortem
litigation.
3. In Terrorem Clauses
Another means of discouraging post-mortem litigation is to in-
corporate language into the will which lessen the financial incen-
tives to contest. This type of testamentary clause, sometimes
referred to as an "in terrorem" clause, typically gives a token
amount to potentially contesting beneficiaries20 3 with the condi-
tion precedent that there be no contest.2 4
Although these clauses have been described as "primitive coer-
cion,' '20 many jurisdictions conditionally allow their use.20 6 The
majority of those jurisdictions, however, stipulate that the will's
forfeiture provisions cannot be invoked if the will is contested in
good faith and with reasonable good cause.207 The drafters of
these provisions must therefore tread a thin line, ensuring that po-
tentially contesting beneficiaries are given enough in the will to
deter any desire to forfeit the allocated amount.20 8 Similarly, the
drafter must also avoid any clause in the will that would give a
potentially contesting beneficiary a good faith basis to contest.20 9
The value of in terrorem clauses, as with almost any clause
incorporated into the will,2 10 is limited by the many potential
grounds for attack that courts could construe to be good faith
grounds.21l These clauses, furthermore, have no value in estab-
lishing the will's technical validity and could conceivably operate
against the testator on questions of testamentary capacity. Still, in
201. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504, 8 U.L.A. 349-50 commentary at 350 (1972).
202. Id.
203. For drafting suggestions, see generally Jack, No Contest or In Terrorem Clauses-
Construction and Enforcement, 19 Sw. LJ. 722, 735-37 (1965).
204. Id.
205. Leavitt, Scope and Effectiveness OfNo-Contest Clauses in Last Wills and Testa-
ments, 15 HASTINGS LJ. 45, 45 (1963).
206. Jack, supra note 203, at 726-27.
207. Leavitt, supra note 205, at 67.
208. Jack, supra note 203, at 730-37.
209. Id.
210. Alternatively, prospective heirs not explicitly mentioned in the will can, in many
jurisdictions, lead to difficulties, particularly where statutes such as UPC § 2-301 create
forced shares in the estate.
211. See generall, RITCHIE, ALFORD, JR.,& EFFLAND, supra note 63, at 310-12.
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terrorem clauses might be practical where there is a strong suspi-
cion that a disgruntled beneficiary will harass the estate with post-
mortem litigation.21 2
4. Conclusions
Supplemental devices to the will cannot preclude post-mortem
litigation. 213 While videotaped wills, self-proving documentation,
and in terrorem clauses can appreciably lessen incentives for chal-
lenging the will, only ante-mortem probate offers a direct means
of establishing the will's validity.2 14
A will drafter has numerous techniques available with which
to avoid possible post-mortem attack.21 5 It is possible, however,
that a particular means of invalidating the will could be over-
looked. The advantage of ante-mortem probate is its wide
scope-the ability to deal with a host of potential problems with a
single procedure.216 The use of one or more specific alternatives to
insure the validity of the will is never a completely satisfactory
method of recording the testator's intent. This is because each
specific alternative is addressed only to a specific problem and not
to the total procedure itself.
B. The Administrative Model as An Ante-Mortem Alternative
Existing contest model ante-mortem statutes217 are similar to
conventional will contest statutes, but contain a major refine-
ment-the proceeding occurs before the testator's death.21 8 Thus,
these statutes suffer from many of the same disadvantages associ-
ated with both will contest actions and ante-mortem probate in
general.219 In response to these problems, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
Drafting Committee for a Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills
Act 220 considered a model draft for an administrative ante-
212. Jack, supra note 203, at 723.
213. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 68.
214. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 203-11 and accompanying text.
216. See Fink, supra note 26, at 266.
217. See generally supra notes 154-85 and accompanying text (brief survey of existing
statutory formulations).
218. See supra note 13.
219. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
220. The National Conference of Commissioners on the Uniform State Laws are com-
prised of members appointed by the governors of their respective states. The NCCUL
drafts model codes and uniform laws when the commissioners deem it both desirable and
practical. These drafts are then offered for approval to the American Bar Association.
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mortem statute that is a significant departure from earlier contest
model formulations.22' The Drafting Committee subsequently
disbanded and the model draft received no further attention.222
In view of the flaws inherent in the existing statutes, 223 there is a
clear need for a viable alternative to the antiquated probate proce-
dures. It seems somewhat premature to simply disregard the ad-
ninistrative model ante-mortem statute when this statute has the
capacity to solve many of the deficiencies of both conventional
probate alternatives 224 and existing ante-mortem statutes.2 2 5
1. The Draft B Model Statute
The NCCUSL Draft B statute is an ex parte administrative
ante-mortem proposal.226 In a Draft B proceeding, the testator
applies for a judicial determination that the will is valid.227 The
word "determination" is used expressly in lieu of "judgment" to
minimize any suggestion of an adversarial proceeding.228 The ef-
fect of this determination is to certify that the will is technically
correct, that the testator had the requisite capacity to execute a
will, and that the testator was not subject to any undue influ-
ence.229 Once such a determination is made the will can only be
challenged if it is shown that another will was probated after the
ante-mortem determination.230
The courts under Draft B have several methods of obtaining
the information necessary for a proper and accurate determina-
tion.23' The court may appoint a special master to interview the
221. See NCCUSL UNIFORM ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE OF WILLS AcT, DRAFT B, sub-
mitted for discussion and consideration at the November 7-9, 1980 meetings of the Draft-
ing Committee, Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act [hereinafter cited as DRAFT
B]. The text of DRAFr B is set forth, without comments, in the Appendix to this Note.
222. There is no evidence in subsequent NCCUSL reports that DRAFT B has been re-
examined or even discussed.
223. Whitman, Preparingfor the Future of Probate in America, 5 CONN. L. REv. 557
(1973). Whitman sees the need for improvement in three areas of probate: 1) expediting
the probate process; 2) making probate more economical; and 3) better protecting the rights
of interested parties. Id. at 560.
224. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 154-84 and accompanying text.
226. G. Alexander, Memorandum to Drafting Committee, Uniform Ante-Mortem Pro-
bate of Wills Act on Proposed Working Drafts and Supplementary Materials 1 (Oct. 15,
1980) (on file at Case Western Reserve Law Review).
227. DA'T B, supra note 221, § 1(a).
228. Id. § I comment.
229. Id.
230. Id. § 6. For a discussion of the Draft B safeguard against revocation by a later
will, see infra note 236 and accompanying text.
231. See generally DRAFT B, supra note 221, §§ 2, 3(a), 3(b).
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testator's legatees, friends, and relatives,232 and may use expert
witnesses, such as psychiatrists, to provide additional information
as it deems necessary.2 33 If the court decides to interview the tes-
tator, Draft B requires that counsel be present to insure the full
protection of the testator's interests.234
Once the court is satisfied that the will is proper, it will issue a
determination which is binding on all parties. 235 Although revo-
cation may be effected by creating a new will or codicil, the statute
suggests that the court be given notice of revocation. 6 Finally,
Draft B stipulates that the testator bear all costs for the ante-
mortem procedure, including any expenses of the special master
and witnesses.237
2. Problems Associated with the Draft B Procedure
The Draft B model statute has two potential defects. The first
is whether an ex parte proceeding is a constitutionally acceptable
method of probate.238 The second is whether there is sufficient
finality in a court decree which is voidable at the testator's whim
through the creation of a new will or codicil.239
The drafters of Draft B, addressing the constitutionality ques-
tion, argue that the right to make a will is a function of the statute.
Thus, being statutorily granted, the prospective beneficiaries'
rights may be statutorily divested.240 Nevertheless, standard no-
tice procedures, conforming with existing probate proceedings,
might also be necessary to ensure the constitutionality of Draft
B.241 This proposal could be placed in the model statute in place
of language stipulating a purely ex parte proceeding.242
Remedying the problem of finality is an inherently easier
232. See id. § 2.
233. Id. § 3(b).
234. Id. § 3 comment.
235. Id. §§ 4, 5.
236. Id. § 6.
237. Id. § 7.
238. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
240. DRAFT B, supra note 221 § 1 comment.
241. Id.
242. The comment to § 1 suggests that:
[sihould the theory supporting the ex parte format be rejected and notice and
opportunity to appear be regarded as necessary, then personal jurisdiction over
"interested parties" would be required under the traditional principles ofjurisdic-




question than that of constitutionality. One solution would be to
modify the statute along the lines of the North Dakota ante-
mortem statute to require a new court proceeding to invalidate a
prior ante-mortem determination.243 Testators seeking to modify
an administrative ante-mortem determination would thus be
forced to seek a second hearing. The expense and difficulties of a
second proceeding may discourage a potential user of an adminis-
trative ante-mortem statute,2' but the finality of the ante-mortem
determination would be assured.
3. The Benefits of Draft B
If the flaws in the Draft B statute pass judicial scrutiny, the
potential benefits of such a proceeding could revolutionize pro-
bate. An administrative proceding would lessen the testator's cost
of an ante-mortem proceeding and would eliminate the cost to the
prospective heirs.245
The confidentiality of the will is assured under a Draft B pro-
ceeding. 46 Except for a collateral attack on the ante-mortem pro-
ceeding itself, direct will contest could be virtually eliminated.247
The testator's intent would be determined while he or she is alive
and any technical problems with the will could be resolved.248
Drafting errors could be identified and corrected prior to a contest
that could invalidate all or part of the will.24 9 Additionally, pro-
bate practitioners might be more accountable for errors in draft-
ing,. since any errors would be discovered in the testator's lifetime
and could have possible malpractice repercussions.
The courts would enjoy a dual benefit. First, post-mortem liti-
gation would be reduced; second, any formal probate proceeding
would be eliminated once the will was probated ante-mortem.250
243. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the finality
requirements under the North Dakota ante-mortem statute.
244. Similarly, notice costs could prove prohibitive if the ex parte proceeding was re-
jected. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 63, at 95-96.
245. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 78-80.
246. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., DRAFT B, supra note 221, § le comment:
An ex parte proceeding in the domiciling state determining the validity of the will
under local rules would be entitled to full faith and credit in sister states, subject
to provision for collateral attack to determine whether the testator was actually
domiciled in the state making the determination.
Id.
248. See Langbein, supra note 20,passim.
249. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
250. See DRAFT B, supra note 221, § 5(b).
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The courts would also benefit indirectly by the increased account-
ability of probate lawyers and the resulting improved work prod-
uct coming to the courts. Ultimately, the greatest benefits should
accrue to the general public under this type of ante-mortem
proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION
Contemporary ante-mortem formulations, represented by the
ante-mortem statutes in Arkansas, North Dakota, and Ohio,25'
cannot fulfill the promise of ante-mortem probate. The value of a
comprehensive procedure which verifies testamentary capacity,
freedom from undue influence, and the technical validity of a will
is too important to be dismissed because of inadequate statutory
formulations.
The primary defect in present ante-mortem statutes is the lack
of confidentiality afforded the testator's will. 252 The contest model
proceeding compels the testator to publicly display a uniquely
personal document that under normal circumstances would not be
revealed or given legal effect until after its creator's death.2 53 It is
not surprising that the existing statutes are rarely utilized.2 5 4
Another serious flaw with existing ante-mortem statutes is the
finality of judgment problem in the Arkansas and Ohio stat-
utes-the court judgment may be overturned by the testator creat-
ing a new testamentary instrument.255 These statutes should be
modified to conform with the North Dakota statute256 to ensure
that the validity of the court's judgment will not be overturned by
such a subsequent testamentary instrument.257 Thus, the testator
should be compelled to seek another ante-mortem judgment
before any subsequent testamentary instruments are given effect.
This is indeed an insignificant burden to bear to obtain the poten-
tial security of an ante-mortem proceeding.
Established alternatives to existing ante-mortem statutes also
have defects. Supplements to the will such as videotaping258 and
self-proving procedures 259 merely create presumptions of validity
251. See supra note 2.
252. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 184.
255. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
257. Id. See also supra notes 57 & 74 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
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that are neither comprehensive nor conclusive in assuring a valid
testamentary disposition. Devices incorporated in the will are
useful in only a relatively narrow range of circumstances and can
easily be overcome. Therefore, such devices cannot assure total
testamentary security.260 These alternatives are really only sup-
plementary measures to comprehensive probate reform.26'
The problems with existing ante-mortem statutes and estab-
lished alternatives to ante-mortem probate have been the subject
of considerable debate. What has yet to be fully addressed is the
administrative model ante-mortem statute advanced by Professors
Alexander and Pearson262 and given shape and form in the
NCCUSL Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act, Draft
B. 2
63
While Draft B has been dropped from consideration with the
subsequent elimination of the Committee on Ante-Mortem Pro-
bate of Wills Act, it deserves reevaluation.264 There are, however,
several problems with Draft B which arise in part from the nov-
elty of the proceeding.26- The procedure's ex parte feature, which
guarantees the security and confidentiality of the will, may be con-
stitutionally difficult to sustain due to the lack of notice afforded
the prospective heirs.2 66 This problem, however, can be conclu-
sively resolved only by the courts.
Draft B's failure to resolve the problem of judgment finality
can be solved by incorporating a provision similar to the revoca-
tion language in the North Dakota ante-mortem statute.2 67 An
ante-mortem determination should not be revoked unless the tes-
tator is willing to revise that determination in another ante-
mortem proceeding.268 This is a small burden to bear for almost
absolute judicial assurance that testator's intent will be followed
and post-mortem litigation eliminated.
Assuming that administrative ante-mortem probate is viable,
the issue becomes whether this type of proceeding should be res-
urrected when existing ante-mortem statutes have failed. : It is
hoped that the failure of existing statutes should not be taken as a
260. See supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
261. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 68.
262. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 63.
263. See supra notes 217-50 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 221.
265. See supra note 13.
266. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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failure of ante-mortem probate as a concept. A widely utilized
administrative ante-mortem procedure could eliminate post-
mortem litigation.269 Technical drafting problems that have
plagued the profession for centuries could be identified and recti-
fied prior to will invalidation.27 ° Finally, ante-mortem probate
operates as a check against error on the part of the drafter, thereby
ultimately benefiting the profession. Draft B deserves an opportu-
nity to provide the probate area with a comprehensive solution to
the present problems of existing ante- and post-mortem
probate.27'
DANIEL A. FRIEDLANDER
269. See generally supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (rationales for ante-
mortem probate delineated).
270. But see Meyer, Ante-Mortem Probate:.An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 10 COLO.
LAW. 2834 (1981) (brief review of ante-mortem probate with author concluding that Colo-
rado should adopt a wait-and-see approach before implementing an ante-mortem statute,
based upon the NCCUSL ante-mortem probate committee determinations).




National Conference of Commissioners for
Uniform State Laws
Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act
Draft B
November 7-9, 1980
SECTION 1. (Application for Ante-Mortem Ver//cation of Will;
Declarations Regarding Due Execution of Will During Testator's
L!etime.)
(a) Venue. During his lifetime a testator may apply to a court
in the county of his domicile for a determination that his will has
been duly executed and is his valid will subject only to subsequent
revocation.
(b) Contents of Application. The application shall contain a
copy of the will that the applicant wishes to have verified and shall
include the following allegations: (1) that the will is in writing
and was signed by the applicant or in the applicant's name by
some other person in the applicant's presence and by his direction
and was signed in the presence of the testator by two persons each
of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's acknowl-
edgement of the signature or of the will; (2) that the instrument
was properly executed with testamentary intent; (3) that the appli-
cant executed the instrument in the exercise of his own free will;
and (4) that the applicant is familiar with the contents of the
instrument.
The original will shall be filed with the application, but neither
the original nor any copy thereof shall be available for inspection
by any person other than the Court except as the Court in its dis-
cretion shall determine to be necessary and proper.
SECTION 2. (Procedure,• Apointment of Special Master.)
(a) Qualpications. Upon the filing of an application, the Court
shall appoint a special master to assist the Court in making deter-
minations regarding due execution of the will. The master shall
be a qualified attorney having no interest in verification of the
will.
(b) Powers and.Duties. The master shall interview the testator
outside the presence of the attorney who prepared the will. He
shall also interview members of the testator's family, other rela-
• This Appendix was provided courtesy of Professor Richard V. Wellman,
University of Georgia School of Law. The NCCUSL commentary has been omitted.
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tives and friends of the testator, or any other individual as the
Court shall direct him. The Court may delegate to the master
such powers of investigation, including the-right to have any rele-
vant documents produced, as it shall deem appropriate under the
circumstances. Following completion of his investigation, the
master shall submit to the Court a written report detailing his
findings. This report shall not be available for inspection to any-
one other than the Court.
SECTION 3. (Procedure, Hearing.)
(a) Hearing; Inquiry by Court. The Court may, if it deems
appropriate, schedule a hearing at which to interview the testator
the attesting witnesses if available, and any other witnesses or rel-
evant evidence. The testator shall at all times be represented by
counsel of his own choice or by court-appointed counsel.
(b) Witnesses; Medical Examination. The Court may call as
witnesses physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, and other per-
sons of its own choosing to examine the testator or to be inter-
viewed by the Court. All interviews shall be conducted at a closed
hearing.
SECTION 4. (Determination on Application.)
If the Court is satisfied that the allegations of the application
have been sustained, it shall issue a written determination that the
testator's will has been duly executed and is his valid will subject
only to subsequent withdrawal of the will or revocation and shall
require the will retained in the custody of the Court.
SECTION 5. (Effect of Determination, Necessity of Post-Mortem
Proceedings to Probate.)
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the deter-
mination of validity of a will during the testator's lifetime under
this procedure shall be conclusive and binding on all persons. Any
will which has been the subject of a determination of validity
under this procedure shall not be subject to subsequent contest by
any person except on the gound of subsequent revocation.
(b) Unless subsequently withdrawn or revoked by the testator
any will which has been the subject of a determination of validity
under this procedure shall be deemed to have been probated and
no proceedings to probate such a will shall be necessary after the
death of the testator, except for purposes of determining whether
such a will has been subsequently revoked or modified.
SECTION 6. (Withdrawal of Will; Revocation.)
A will determined to be valid under the procedure may be
[Vol. 32:823
19821 ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE 855
withdrawn during the testator's lifetime provided the testator files
with the Court written notice of his withdrawal or revocation.
Upon filing such notice with the Court, the will previously deter-
mined to be valid shall no longer be deemed his valid will. A will
previously determined to be valid hereunder may also be revoked
or modified by a subsequent will or codicil though the Court is not
informed thereof.
SECTION 7. (Compensation and Expenses.)
The special master and any physician, psychologist, psychia-
trist, or other person employed by the Court or the special master
hereunder are entitled to reasonable compensation. The testator
shall be responsible for expenses associated with these
proceedings.

